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Abstract. This paper explores optimal location-dependent but time-invariant peak-
load charges on a road and a train in a continuous closed city with bottleneck road 
congestion and rail overcrowding. In our model, rail and car commuters both choose 
their departure times, considering their schedule delay costs and dynamically changing 
transportation costs, and their residential locations. Our theoretical results show that 
when the bottleneck is located at the fringe of the CBD area (Situation 1), the optimal 
uniform toll and fares are determined by the difference in price distortions between the 
train and cars. When the bottleneck on the road is located some distance from the CBD 
(Situation 2), the optimal uniform toll and fares are represented by price distortions of 
the cars and train, respectively. Our quantitative results show that, in Situation 1, our 
toll and fares can achieve 25% of the first-best welfare gains, whereas, in Situation 2, 
our toll and fares can achieve approximately 30% of the first-best welfare gains.  
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We explore location-dependent but time-invariant peak-load charges on cars and trains in 
a continuous city, considering the interplay between cars and trains. We consider a 
situation with dynamic change in road congestion and train overcrowding, in which 
commuters living all over the city choose their departure times as well as transport mode, 
and their residential locations.  
Severe road congestion is one of the most important problems in urban areas. The 
first-best policy is to impose congestion tolls that vary at each point of driving time such 
that every motorist always faces the marginal social cost. However, it is difficult to 
implement the first-best congestion tolls because of the potentially enormous 
implementation and operation costs, as indicated by Rouwendel and Verhoef (2006). 
Accordingly, second-best policies such as cordon pricing are implemented in cities such 
as London and Singapore because they are easier to introduce than the first-best. 
 Severe overcrowding on commuter trains is also an important problem in urban 
areas. Possible solutions are an increase in the number of trains, and construction of new 
railway lines, etc. But these are not always possible on every line because they take a lot 
of construction time and cost. Correspondingly, we focus on congestion fares, which are 
easier to implement than construction of railways. In fact, these have been introduced in 
Washington and London subways for the purpose of relieving overcrowding. 
     We focus on the congestion problems of the two modes and seek congestion charge 
levels for road and rail in a continuous closed monocentric city. Congestion charges for 
cars and trains change the population density, the modal choice at each location and the 
size of the city. Accordingly, we need to consider a continuous city.  
     Since the two modes have different congestion mechanisms, many papers have 
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explored a two-transport-mode system. For example, Tabuchi (1993), Arnott and Yan 
(2000) and Romeo et al. (2002) explore a railway system in a model with congested roads. 
However, most related papers do not consider urban space, setting only one set of origin 
and destination points. Haring et al. (1976), Anas and Moses (1979) and Sasaki (1989) 
suppose an urban space with two transport modes but do not study transportation charge 
policies. Although Arnott and Yan (2000) and Quentin and Renaud (2014) consider 
congestion in a public transportation system, population density is given exogenously. 
     The common way of modeling congestion in urban areas is static flow congestion, 
where the timing of travel is not a choice variable, and where traffic flows and speeds at 
each location are constant over time. The bottleneck model, developed by Vickrey (1969), 
can also express congestion externality. The bottleneck model is a dynamic model of 
traffic congestion, in which the choice of departure times is endogenous, and where 
dynamic patterns of travel delays are key features. However, most papers exploring 
bottleneck congestion do not consider urban spaces in the city. 
A few recent papers have taken account of dynamic congestion in urban space. For 
instance, Fosgerau and de Palma (2012) and Takayama and Kuwahara (2016) consider a 
continuous city with a central bottleneck, exploring welfare improvements of 
heterogeneous residents. These papers mainly focus on the effects of bottleneck 
congestion and an optimal time-varying congestion toll on the spatial structure of cities. 
 The first novel point of the current paper is that it explores simultaneous 
optimization of time-invariant charges at the bottleneck of the road and railway fares at 
each location in the continuous city with endogenously determined residential locations. 
These charges cannot exclude congestion externalities completely because the dynamic 
distribution of departure times is not the first-best. Indeed, in the cities imposing 
congestion tolls, they impose time-invariant tolls, or small variations at best during peak 
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hours. This practical imposition is useful for calculation of optimal tolls and fares as well 
as ease of understanding for users. But it generates deadweight losses due to inefficient 
dynamic distribution of transport demand. Our examination can identify how the 
deadweight losses can be minimized, focusing on the interplay between the two modes1.  
 The second novel point is that we model railway commuters who compare the 
schedule delay cost and train overcrowding cost in a continuous city. This model 
theoretically demonstrates a novel property about location- and departure-time-dependent 
crowding of a train (See Lemma 1). This property is verified by the data of a railway in 
Tokyo. With these railway commuters and the car commuters who compare the schedule 
delay and the transportation costs, we express the interplay between the two modes.  
 The third novel point is that we consider the end point of the railway. This is realistic, 
but previous theoretical papers have not actively considered this. As a result, we can show 
the optimal policies for the residents living beyond the end point of the railway. In 
addition, we exogenously set different road bottleneck locations. 
Our results show how price distortions of a bottleneck and railway fares are related 
in a city with a bottleneck in the road and multiple overcrowded trains on a line, 
depending on the geographical location of the bottleneck in the road. Furthermore, we 
perform numerical simulations to obtain changes in the welfare level. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 develops an urban model with 
car and train commuting depending on the location of the road bottleneck. Section 3 
explores optimal peak-load time-invariant car tolls and railway fares. Numerical 
simulations are shown in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
1 Many other second-best situations have been explored (e.g. Tikoudis, et al. (2018) and Kono and 
Kawaguchi (2017) considering distortions in the housing market; Parry and Bento (2001), Tikoudis 
et al. (2015), and Kono et al. (2020) considering distortions in the labor market.) The current paper 




2. The model 
2.1. The City 
We construct a congested monocentric rectangular city. The width of the residential area 
is normalized to one, and the area extends from 𝑥 at the CBD edge to 𝑥 at the urban 
growth boundary (UGB). The city has two transport modes with road congestion and rail 
overcrowding. When car commuters pass through a single bottleneck located at 𝑥௕, they 
incur dynamic traffic congestion.  
The city is composed of four essentially-heterogenous zones: zone 0 (CBD area), 
which extends from 0 to 𝑥 , zone 1, which extends from 𝑥  to the location of the 
bottleneck 𝑥௕, zone 2, which extends from 𝑥௕ to the end point of the railway 𝑥௥, and 
zone 3, which extends from 𝑥௥ to the urban boundary 𝑥 (See Fig. 1). 
The commuters living in zones 1 and 2 choose road or rail, and the commuters 
living in zone 3 use only cars because they live beyond the end point of the railway. We 
assume that the desired arrival time is the same. Car commuters living in zones 2 and 3 
have to incur time cost if congestion arises at the bottleneck. Assuming a so-called point 
queue, bottleneck congestion does not have a physical distance. Due to a physical 
constraint of the bottleneck’s capacity, car commuters necessarily arrive earlier2 than the 
desired arrival time. In such a case, they have to incur the schedule cost. As a result of 
trade-off between time cost and schedule cost, they incur the same total private cost. 
 We assume that there is an effective bottleneck in the road, and that there is no road 
congestion at other locations. Rail commuters incur discomfort cost due to train 
overcrowding in addition to travel time cost and fare. Due to the physical capacity of the 
railway car, not all the rail commuters can arrive at the desired arrival time but the 
 




majority of them have to arrive earlier. In such a case, they have to incur the schedule 
delay cost. As a result of trade-off between the discomfort cost and the schedule delay 
cost, all the commuters incur the same private cost. 
 
Fig. 1 The city  
 We consider a closed city. The land is publicly owned and the land is rented by 
developers to build dwelling units. The total supply per unit area of land at location x is 
1 for simplicity. The road operator introduces toll 𝜏, which is levied uniformly throughout 
peak hours at the bottleneck. The railway operator optimizes location-dependent railway 
fare e(x), but impose it uniformly throughout peak hours. 
2.2. Behavior of commuters 
We assume that N identical households reside in the city. For simplicity, we suppose the 
number of households in the city is equal to the number of commuters. A household has 
a utility function 
1( , )carJj j jk q     , (1)  
where 1( , )J carj jjv k q      is a function of the numeraire composite goods k, the 
change in utility from rail use to road use carj , and housing square footage q. k includes 
all goods except for floor space. carj  depends on day j, but the distribution of carj  
follows a certain probability function. j  is a dummy variable which equals 1 if a person 
uses his car and equals 0 if he uses a train. J is a certain period and j is one day of J. 
 The simple sum of k  and 1J carj jj    in Eq. (1) might appear specific. This 
requires an explanation. First, normally we can set a utility function as 
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1( , , )
J car
j jju k q  . In this situation, if 1( )J carj jju k u       , we can represent the 
utility function as Eq. (1). This condition implies that k and 1J carj jj    are perfectly 
substitutable. In other words, carj  is measured in terms of k . Since the probability 
distribution of carj  can be any function, Eq. (1) represents a large variety of preferences 
over composite goods, transportation, and housing. 
 An example of the probability function ( )car    is shown in Fig. 1, where 
( ( ))x  is a probability of using a car, given as ( )( ( )) ( )car carxx d   
   . ( )x  is a 
value of carj  when the difference between car and train commuting costs equals carj  
(See Fig. 2), which is mathematically shown as 
( ) ( ) ( )car railx t x t x   , (2)  
where 𝑡௖௔௥(𝑥) is the commuting cost by car and 𝑡௥௔௜௟(𝑥) is the commuting cost by rail, 
which is composed of travel time cost and railway fare. 
 
Fig. 2 Train and car user ratios 
 The revenues of land rent R, congestion toll T, and rail fare E are equally distributed 
among all households. In addition, all households equally incur the railway maintenance 
cost Z, and construction cost X. That is, [ ] /R T E Z X N G N      is distributed to 
each household, where G is non-labor income. 
 Each household earns income y per period. A household rents floor space from 
developers at price r per unit space per period. The income constraint is expressed as 
 
Probability density   Car user ratio   





 1 1( ) 1 ( )J Jcar railj jj j Gk rq y t x t x N             . (3)  
We assume that J is a sufficiently long term. Because carj   has a certain 
probability function, the values of 1J carj jj   , which is the number of car commutes, 
and 1[1 ]J jj   , which is the number of rail commutes, will converge to certain values, 
which are hereafter defined by 𝐽௖௔௥(𝑥) and 𝐽௥௔௜௟(𝑥). In addition, the certain values will 
be common over the households living at location x. 
 Floor rent r equals the maximum floor rent bid by a household as a result of 
competition among residents. Mathematically, such behavior is expressed by 
( ), , ,
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
max ( ) ( )car rail
car car rail rail
q x k J J
Gy J x t x J x t x kNx q xr
   
  s.t. Eq. (1). (4)  
Solving Eq. (4) and using utility level ( )v x  at location x yields 
 ( ), ( ), , ( )carr r t x x G x   and  ( ), ( ), , ( )carq q t x x G x   . (5)  
2.3. Population at location x and car commuting cost 
The commuters living in zones 1 and 2 choose road or rail and the commuters living in 
zone 3 use only road. Variables ( ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )car carn x n x t x r x e x x ) are separated into 
zone 0 (0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥), zone 1 (𝑥 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥௕), zone 2 (𝑥௕ ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥௥), and zone 3 (𝑥௥ ≤ 𝑥 ≤𝑥 ), with subscripts 0-3 added to denote zone number. n(x) denotes the number of 
households residing beyond x, and represents the number of commuters passing location 
x. The number of households residing beyond x, ( )in x , {1, 2, 3}i   are defined as 
 1 1 2 3




bx x xn x ds ds ds x x xq s q s q s      , (6)  
 2 2 3




b rx xn x ds ds x x xq s q s    , (7)  
 3 3
1( ) , ,( )
x
rxn x ds x x xq s  . (8)  
Since 𝑥 is the inner edge of the residential area, 𝑛ଵ(𝑥) represents the total number of 
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commuters (i.e., 𝑛ଵ൫𝑥൯ = 𝑁 ). 𝑛௖௔௥(𝑥)  and 𝑛௥௔௜௟(𝑥)  are the number of commuters 
who use road and rail, respectively, at location x. 
 Moving on to the commuting cost, we will first explain the commuting cost of a car. 
We assume that the desired arrival times of all commuters are the same, so all car 
commuters in zones 2 and 3 incur the same private cost at the bottleneck. Using 𝑛ଶ௖௔௥(𝑥௕), 
which represents the number of car commuters passing location 𝑥௕ (i.e., the total number 
of car commuters in zones 2 and 3), this is deterministically obtained as 2 ( )carc b cn x s , 
where c is a parameter and cs is the bottleneck capacity, as shown in Arnott et al. (1993). 
All car commuters incur free flow cost, which linearly increases with respect to the 
distance. Using parameter b, the generalized cost per distance is expressed as ( )cart x b , 
where a dot expresses a differentiation with respect to distance. In addition, car 
commuters incur congestion tolls 𝜏 , which the road operator may introduce at the 
bottleneck. The cost of a car commuter is shown as 
1 ( )cart x bx 　, (9)  
 2 ( )( ) , 2,3carcar c bh
c
n xt x bx hs
   + . (10)  
2.4. Railway commuting cost  
Next, we set the commuting cost of rail. Van den Berg and Verhoef (2012) construct 
a dynamic model regarding rail congestion, assuming an origin-destination pair. We 
extend this to include many origin points. The number of trains to run is 𝑀, and all the 
trains start at different times and all the trains run between the CBD and the end point of 
the railway. Rail commuters choose train 𝑚 (1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑀). Train 1 reaches the CBD at 
the commuters’ desired arrival time 𝑡ଵ. As the train number increases, the train arrives 
earlier, train M arriving at the earliest time 𝑡ெ. We assume that no rail commuter reaches 
9 
 
the CBD later than the desired arrival time. Fig. 3 shows train m, with train numbers on 
the vertical axis, and the distance from the CBD on the horizontal axis.  
 
Fig. 3 Train service 
 Rail commuters at location x incur rail fare ( )he x  , train overcrowding cost, 
schedule delay cost, and travel time cost a x , and a is a parameter, where   1, 2h  is 
zone number. Train overcrowding cost of train m for a resident at location x is expressed 
as  ( )x railmx n x dx , where 𝜌 is a monotonically increasing function and 𝑛௠௥௔௜௟(𝑥) (1 ≤𝑚 ≤ 𝑀 ) is the number of rail commuters who use train m. 𝑛௠௥௔௜௟(𝑥) decreases with 
respect to train number. Schedule delay cost of train m is expressed as 𝜎(𝑡௠ − 𝑡ଵ), where 𝜎 is a parameter, 𝑡௠ (1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑀) is arrival time when a commuter takes train m.  𝜎 
represents per unit cost of early arrival. 
 When a commuter takes train M, they do not incur the train overcrowding cost, but 
incurs the highest schedule delay cost. On the other hand, when a commuter takes train 1, 
they do not incur the schedule delay cost but incurs the highest train overcrowding cost. 
The commuting cost of railway at location x is expressed as 
   10( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1, 2, 3, , )xrail railm m mc x ax e x n s ds t t m M        . (11)  
At equilibrium, any rail commuter at location x is unable to find a train which 
reduces his total cost. In other words, 𝐶௠௥௔௜௟ should be constant for all m. 
1 ( ) ( ) 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )rail rail rail rail railm M x M xC x c x c x c x c x       , (12)  
where ( )railC x  is the commuter cost of rail at location x in equilibrium. The constraint of 




1 ( ) ( )M x rail railii n x n x  . (13)  
     We explore the equilibrium of rail commuters in the residential areas. First, we 
consider the equilibrium for rail commuters living at 𝑥. Commuting costs of the lth 
train ( )raillc x  and that of the kth train ( )railkc x are equal for 𝑘 ≤ 𝑙, where k and l are 
arbitrary numbers. Therefore, 
     0 0( ) ( )x xrail raill k k ln s ds n s ds t t       for 𝑘 ≤ 𝑙, (14)  
 
where the left-hand side means the difference in train overcrowding cost in the lth train 
and that in the kth train. The right-hand side means the difference in schedule delay cost 
in the lth train and that in the kth train. This equality implies that overcrowding cost of 
each train is balanced with the schedule delay cost.  
 At equilibrium, every commuter living at the city boundary 𝑥 has no incentive 
to change their train. That implies that the congestion cost in the trains running from 𝑥 
to 0 should be balanced with the opportunity cost of early arrival. This discussion is for 
commuters residing at 𝑥. However, every commuter residing beyond 𝑥 also has the 
same condition that the congestion cost in the trains running from 𝑥 to 0 should be 
balanced with the opportunity cost of early arrival because they face the same situations 
for this interval (0, 𝑥). This point is important for the next discussion.    
    We next consider the equilibrium for rail commuters living between 𝑥 and 𝑥௥. 
The commuting cost from 𝑥 to 0 has already been determined based on the equilibrium 
of residents living at 𝑥, i.e., Eq. (14). So, it is sufficient to check the commuting cost 
from the residence to 𝑥. Commuting cost of the lth train service ( )raillc x and that in the 
kth train service ( )railkc x are equal (𝑘 ≤ 𝑙), shown as 
   ( ) ( )    for ( , )x xrail raill k rx xn s ds n s ds x x x     for any 𝑘 and 𝑙.   (15)  
(Train overcrowding cost)  (Schedule delay cost) 
11 
 
Eq. (15) means all rail commuters at location x incur the same level of train overcrowding 
cost between 𝑥  and 𝑥  regardless of train number. In addition, the number of rail 
commuters at location x is equal between 𝑥 and 𝑥 regardless of train number. From Eq. 
(13), the number of rail commuters at location 𝑥 (𝑥 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥௥ ) is proportional to the 
number of total rail commuters 𝑛௥௔௜௟(𝑥). These results are summarized in Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 1 (Overcrowding level on each train at each location). (1) The overcrowding 
cost of the trains running from 𝑥 to 0 should be balanced with the opportunity cost of 
the early arrival of the trains. (2) Rail commuters at location x incur the same level of 
train overcrowding cost between 𝑥 and 𝑥 regardless of which train they use. 
 
  Van den Berg and Verhoef (2012) already show Lemma 1 (1). But since they set one 
origin-destination pair, Lemma 1 (2) is not obtained3. We extend their model to many 
pairs with multiple origins and a single destination. Due to the constraints of data 
availability, it is difficult to completely check these properties shown in Lemma 1 (1) and 
(2) in real situations. But, using the data of two routes in Tokyo, we are able to verify that 
Lemma (1) and (2) hold in real situations. The analysis is included in Appendix B. 
 Using Lemma 1 (2), train overcrowding cost between 𝑥 and 𝑥 is expressed as 
   ( ) ( )x xrail railmx xn s ds f n s ds   , (16)  
where f   is a monotonically increasing positive function. This implies that, in 
equilibrium, train overcrowding cost for rail commuters from location 𝑥  to 𝑥  is 
determined by a function of the number of total rail commuters at location 𝑥 . With 
Lemma 1 (1), following Van den Berg and Verhoef (2012), if we specify the crowding 
 
3 One might feel that this result is not realistic. In real situations, there are some different conditions 
such as multiple destination points and heterogenous desired times. In the real world, Lemma 1 
would not hold due to these conditions. However, it is important to focus on the mechanisms. So, we 
set the current homogenous conditions.  
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cost function    ( ) ( )rail railm mn x n x     , where θ is a positive parameter,  the 
commuting cost of rail is expressed as4 
 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )) , 1, 2
h xrail car carh i ih xi
t x ax e x xf n x n x f n s n s ds h

       , (17)  
1 11 1( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))rail cart x ax e x xf n x n x    . (18)  
2.5. Landowners, road operators and railway operators  
The revenue of land rent is expressed as 
0 1 1 10
2 2 2 3 3
( ) ( ( ), ( ), , ( ))








R r x dx r t x x G v x dx







. (19)  
Road operators impose congestion toll 𝜏 at the bottleneck. Since all car commuters 
pass the bottleneck, the total revenue of congestion toll is expressed as 
2 ( )car bT Jn x  . (20)  
 Railway operators construct a railway in the city and maintain it. The cost related 
to rail is divided into operation cost and construction cost. The operation cost varies in 
accordance with total transport distance, which is the sum of personal commuting 
distance of all individuals. It is expressed as 
     1 1 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )b rbx xcar car carx xZ Jz x n x n x n x n x dx n x n x dx          , (21) 
where Z is marginal cost per passenger distance. The construction cost varies with the 
distance. Since the railway extends from 𝑥 to 𝑥௥, the construction cost is expressed as 
rX Ix , (22)  
where I is construction cost of the railway per distance. 
 The total revenue of rail fare e(x) is expressed as 
 
4 The specification of the crowding cost function is necessary for the derivation. The derivation 
process is shown on the authors’ website. 
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   1 1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )b r
b
x xcar car
x xE J e x n x n x dx J e x n x n x dx         . (23)  
2.6. Market equilibrium conditions 
Since households can choose any residential location, household utility is equal to a 
common level u at any locations. The level of u is endogenously determined as 
( )   [1, ]v x u x x   . (24)  
The population constraint at each location, which is obtained by differentiating Eqs. (6) -
(8) with respect to x, should hold, as 
     3 3( ( ), ( ), , ( )) ( ) 1, 1, 2 , ( ( ), , ( )) ( ) 1car carh h hq t x x G v x n x h q t x G v x n x       . (25)  
Using Eqs. (6)-(8), (25) and the modal ratio ( ( ))x , we obtain the following relations. 
1 1 1 2 2 3( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )b r
b r
x x xcar
x x xn x n s s ds n s s ds n s ds           ,  (26)  
2 2 2 3( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )r
r
x xcar
x xn x n s s ds n s ds       (27)  
3 3( ) ( )xcar xn x n s ds     (28)  
2.7. Social welfare function 
The optimality of car and rail charges is defined as maximizing social welfare. The social 
welfare W is the total utility of households. The optimal car toll and rail fare are given by  
1 2
1 2 , ( ), ( )[ , ( ), ( )] arg m axe x e xe x e x W Nu    
s.t. Eqs. (1)-(28). 
(29) 
Because we assume a closed city, the total population N is exogenous. 
 
3. Theoretical examination 
3.1. Optimal car toll and rail fare when bottleneck is located at the edge of CBD 
As a result of examination, we obtain Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1 (Optimal toll and fare with the bottleneck at the CBD edge) 






2 2 2 222
2 2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
for ( , )
car carcarc
x car carc x
r
zx x n x n x f n x n xn xe x s n s n s f n s n s ds
x x x

            

 . (30) 
See Appendix A for the detailed derivation. 
 
Proposition 1 shows the condition for optimal car toll and rail fares. The 
difference between car toll and rail fare at x equals the difference between the cost of 
passing through the bottleneck and the sum of railway marginal operation cost and 
congestion cost at x. 
 
3.2. Optimal car toll and rail fares when bottleneck is located in residential area 
We obtain Proposition 2 when the bottleneck is located in the residential area. 
Proposition 2 (Optimal fare on the CBD side of the bottleneck with the 
bottleneck in the residential area) 
When the bottleneck is located in the residential area, the optimal rail fare inside 
the location of the bottleneck satisfies 
 
    
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))
for ( , )
car car
x car car carb bx
b
zx x n x n x f n x n x
e x
n s n s n x n x f n s n s ds
x x x
            

 . (31) 
See Appendix A for the detailed derivation. 
Proposition 2 implies that the optimal rail fare at x on the CBD side of the bottleneck 
equals the sum of marginal operation cost and train overcrowding cost from x to the CBD. 
This is equal to the first-best charge in terms of formulation. This holds because car 





Proposition 3 (Optimal fare outside the bottleneck with the bottleneck in the 
residential area) 
When the bottleneck is in the residential area, the optimal rail fares beyond the 
bottleneck satisfy 
 
    
   
1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1
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x x






Proposition 3 implies that the optimal rail fare at x beyond the bottleneck equals the 
sum of marginal operation cost and train overcrowding cost from x to the CBD. Similar 
to Proposition 2, optimal rail fares are determined only by rail-related costs, not by car-
related cost even though the optimal uniform toll and fares are second-best. See Chapter 
7 of Kono and Joshi (2019) for the optimal conditions of multiple second-best policies. 
 
Proposition 4 (The optimal car toll, as in Arnott et al. (1993)) 
When the bottleneck is in the residential area, the optimal car toll satisfies 




  . (33) 
Proposition 4 implies that, when the bottleneck is in the residential area, the optimal 
car toll at the location of the bottleneck is the same as shown in Arnott et al. (1993), who 
consider elastic car demand for an origin-destination pair without a railway, even if we 
consider a continuous and closed city5. 
 
 
5 The current paper assumes that the end of the railway is given. But, if that is optimized, when 
optimal car toll and rail fares are imposed, the optimal end point of the railway line satisfies 
2 3( ) ( )r rr x r x I  . 
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4. Numerical Situations 
4.1. The Setup 
Similar to the setup adopted by Kono et al.(2012), we divide the residential areas 
into narrow, discrete rings with an equal width c. We call the rings ‘bands’. The length 
of each band is denoted as i , where i  represents band number. The distance of each 
band from the CBD is denoted as 1ii jjx  . A station is at the center of each band. 
Commuting cost for a resident in a band is set as the commuting cost from the center 
point of each band to the CBD. We specify the utility function as 1( , )J carj jjv k q  
1 ln 31000
J car
j jjk q     , where   is a positive parameter.  
From the viewpoint of calculation burden, we consider only six bands, which 
corresponds to zones in Figure 1, as follows. 
Table 1. Zones in Figure 1 and the corresponding bands 
 
Next, the total cost of cars carit  is expressed as  
1




     , (34) 
which is essentially equal to Eq. (10). The only difference in the notation is 1i jjb  , 
which is the generalized travel cost including time and distance cost. Parameter b  
expresses the generalized travel cost incurred while driving 1 km. Using average car 
speed carv , unit-distance travel expense   and value of time w , b  is calculated as 
carb w v   . 
     The total commuting cost of railway railit  is expressed as  
( )rail raili i i i it ax e x f n Q    , (35) 
Zones in Figure 1 Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 
Corresponding zones Band 1 Band 2 Band 3 Band 4 Band 5 Band 6 
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where Q  is access cost. The rest of the notation is similar to the notation in Eq. (18). 
Parameter a  expresses the travel time cost per distance. Using average train speed railv  
and value of time w  , a   is calculated as raila w v  . ( )raili ix f n   is train 
overcrowding cost and ( )railif n  is a train overcrowding cost function. 
     The function of the train overcrowding is specified as follows. t  is the service 
interval of trains during peak hours. trainc  is the capacity of a train. However, regardless 
of the actual train time schedule, to smoothly evaluate the welfare effect of toll and fare 
policies, we regard trains to run every minute. Accordingly, the capacity of a train trainc  
can be calculated as /trainc t . So, we suppose that passengers incur train overcrowding 
cost when there are more than c  persons in a train. The congestion cost is set as 
congestion parameter f  multiplied by the number of commuters, as expressed by6 
 ( )rail rail raili i train if n f n c n  , (36) 
 ( ) 0 0rail raili i trainf n n c   . (37) 
The frequency of trains is exogenously given. From Eq. (14), the commuting cost 
of rail in the kth train for residents in Band 1 is equal to that in the k-1th train. So, 
 12 / 60rail railk k cf n n     , (38) 
 
where the left-hand side means the difference in train overcrowding cost and the right-
hand side means the difference in scheduling delay cost. In Eq. (38),  1rail railk kn n   
means the difference in the number of rail commuters between the trains. Accordingly, 
the total number of rail commuters mS  can be expressed as  
 
6 Congestion cost in a railway car normally increases non-linearly. However, it is difficult to obtain 
the numerical solutions if such a function is used. So, we use the linear function as an 
approximation. 
(Train overcrowding cost)  (Schedule delay cost) 
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where fn  is the number of rail commuters on the first train to arrive at the CBD during 
peak hours. m means the total number of commuter trains during rush hours. In 
equilibrium, the total volume of rail commuters is affected by the land rent. Therefore, 
the number of commuter trains during peak hours is determined by Eq. (39).  
The total population beyond i  , in  is given by ii i ij in c D

  , and the total 
number of car commuters and train commuters beyond i  , carin  and railin  are given 
by icari i i ij in c D

   and (1 )iraili i i ij in c D  , where i  denotes the 
outermost rings, such that 0in   ,  and iD  is the population density. Here, we 






   , (40) 
where 1a  and 1b  denote the smallest car  and the largest car  of the probability 
density function. i  is the difference in commuting cost between car and train in Band 
i  , which is expressed by  
car rail
i i it t   . (41) 
     Finally, the social welfare is expressed as  
    11 1( ) 1 2i icar rail railj j j b j j o j j rj jW c D u r J n x J e x z n n Ix                (42) 
where y  is income and N is the total number of households. The iterative process 
begins 1i   with 1n N  and is implemented conditionally on the value of u, which 
should satisfy the equilibrium condition. 
     We calibrate parameters, using some real data for the city of Sendai, Japan. The 
total number of households N is set at 20,800, which is equal to the total number of 
1
1 2 ( 1)2 120
m rail cm k fk
mS n n mf


          , (39) 
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commuters of the households living in the area within 1.5 km on either side of the Sendai 
Subway Namboku Line. The CBD edge x  is set at 1km. The UGB x  is set at 13 km. 
The end point of the railway is located at 10 km. The length of each band i  is 2 km. 
The width c  is set as 0.6 km.7 The income per household per year is set at $42,628.555, 
which is generalized income. Housing parameter   in the utility function is set at 8,000, 
implying 20 percent of the income of $40,000. The value of time w  equals $24.06/hour. 
The number of trips to the CBD is set at 230 per person per year. Other parameters are 
explained in Appendix C. 
    We analyze two patterns of the bottleneck point located at the edge of the CBD and 
between Band 1 and Band 2 to gauge the efficacy of toll and fare policies obtained as 
Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4. We call the two patterns Situations1 and 2, defined as 
Situation 1: the bottleneck point is located in the edge of the CBD. 
Situation 2: the bottleneck point is located between Band 1 and Band 2. 
4.2. Numerical result 
We show the results in Table 2 and Table 3. We can analyze how much road 
congestion and train overcrowding influence welfare gains. For each situation, we 
calculated three equilibria: (a) laissez-faire, (b) first-best toll and fares (i.e., optimal 
dynamic toll and fares), (c) optimal uniform toll and fares (second-best). Under laissez-
faire, toll   is 0 and each rail fare is set at marginal cost. Under the first-best, optimal 
dynamic toll is levied at the location of the bottleneck. Optimal dynamic tolls and fine 
(the first-best) rail fares eliminate congestion externalities perfectly.  
The capacity of a train t r a inc is set as follows. Under laissez-faire, because trains are 
operated every four minutes during the peak hours in Sendai, t r a inc   is set as 144 
 
7 In the area within 1.5 km on either side of the railway, the ratio of commuters to households is 




(persons/minute). However, under the first-best and the uniform toll and fares, we set 
t r a inc  as 288 (persons/minute) because we can increase the frequency of trains on a line 
such as the Tokyo Metro Ginza Line, where trains run every two minutes during rush hour. 
Table 2. Numerical results: social welfare 
Note: (a) laissez-faire; (b) first-best; (c) second-best, T: congestion toll revenue, E: railway fare 
revenue, Z: total cost of railway Z.  












Note: (a) laissez-faire; (c) second-best 
We will now discuss welfare gains. In Situation 1, the welfare gains under the optimal 
uniform toll and fares are $9.33 million, which is equal to 24.6 percent of the first-best 
welfare gains. The welfare gains per household are $448. In Situation 2, the welfare gains 
are $7.41 million, which is equal to 28.8 percent of the first-best welfare gains.  
    Factors which affect welfare gains are 1) the number of car commuters, 2) the 
 W Welfare gain U T E Z 
Road 
congestion Train overcrowding 
 (10଻$) (%) ($) (10଻$) (10଺$) (10଺$) (10଻$) (10଻$) 
Situation 1         
(a) 3.066 － 1474.1 0 3.950 3.950 5.462 1.423 
(b) 6.849 100.0 3292.8 2.635 8.694 4.086 0 0 
(c) 3.999 24.6 1922.4 2.945 4.017 4.478 4.734 1.071          
Situation 2         
(a) 5.311 － 2553.5 0 3.648 3.648 3.299 1.287 
(b) 7.881 100.0 3789.0 1.599 7.922 3.782 0 0 
(c) 6.052 28.8 2909.5 2.677 1.240 3.841 2.672 0.8570 
 τ 𝑒ଵ 𝑒ଶ 𝑒ଷ 𝑒ସ 𝑒ହ 
 ($/𝑑𝑎𝑦) ($/𝑑𝑎𝑦) ($/𝑑𝑎𝑦) ($/𝑑𝑎𝑦) ($/𝑑𝑎𝑦) ($/𝑑𝑎𝑦) 
Situation 1       
(a) 0 44 88 131 175 219 
(c) 1025 44 88 131 175 219 
Situation 2       
(a) 0 44 88 131 175 219 
(c) 1210 565 609 653 697 741 
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number of rail commuters, and 3) population in each band. First, we discuss the numbers 
of car commuters and rail commuters. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 indicate the number of car 
commuters and that of rail commuters, respectively, in Situation1 and Situation 2. In 
Situation 1, the number of car commuters in each band decreases and that of rail 
commuters increases by our (second-best) toll system because car congestion is more 
severe than train overcrowding in our numerical model. In this way, optimal uniform 
charges improve social welfare. However, in Situation 2, the number of car commuters 
increases greatly on the CBD side of the bottleneck (i.e. in Band 1) although the number 
of rail commuters in Band 1 increases mildly. The number of car commuters in each band 
is equal to the product of population and the car share in each band. We will discuss 
population and the modal share in each band.   
Population in each band is shown in Fig. 6. In Situation 1, population in Band 6 
decreases and population in other bands slightly increases with the optimal uniform toll 
and fares. In other words, this indicates that households in Band 6 move to Bands 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5 because rail is not available in Band 6 and total commuting costs incurred by 
households in Band 6 in a year are more than those incurred by households in other 
bands. In addition, most commuters do not change residential location with the optimal 
uniform toll and fare system. In Situation 2, population in Band 6 decreases as in 
Situation 1. However, population in Band 1 increases and populations in Bands 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 decrease because one year’s commuting costs incurred by households in Band 1 






Fig. 4 The number of car commuters 
 
Fig. 5 The number of rail commuters 
 
Fig. 6 Population distribution 
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In Situation 2 
In Situation 1 
In Situation 1 
In Situation 2 
In Situation 2 
23 
 
increases in commuting costs per person in each band after imposing our toll and fare 
system. All the commuters using rail are influenced equally by train overcrowding 
externalities because our numerical setup generates rail overcrowding only in Band 1. 
Households using cars outside the location of the bottleneck are influenced equally by 
bottleneck congestion externalities. However, households using cars inside the location 
of the bottleneck are not influenced by them at all because they do not pass through the 
bottleneck. So, households outside the location of the bottleneck have more commuting 
costs in a year than households inside the location of the bottleneck and move to the 
CBD side of the bottleneck in order to escape the car congestion externalities. 
Population in Band 1 increases and populations in other bands decrease as in Fig. 6.  
 
Fig. 7 Increases in commuting costs in Situation 2 
Fig. 7 can explain how the modal shares change by using the relative costs of the two 
modes. The car share on the CBD side of the bottleneck increases and the car shares 
beyond the bottleneck decrease. On the CBD side of the bottleneck, the increase in train 
commuting cost is higher than that of car, which is equal to 0. So, households there try to 
avoid train overcrowding and the car share increases. Outside the location of the 
bottleneck, the increase in rail commuting cost is less than that of car. So, households 
there try to avoid car congestion and use rail, and the car shares decrease. Welfare gains 
are influenced by the changes in residential locations and modal shares.    
0
1076 1076 1076 1076 1076
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Finally, in order to analyze how much road congestion affects welfare gains8, we 
changed bottleneck capacity c  from 11500 to 10350 and 12650. Table 5 presents the 
results in the case of each capacity when the bottleneck is located at the edge of the CBD. 
The welfare gains at low capacity ( 10350c  ) are the highest among the three cases, 
$10.46 million and the gains per household are $503. The welfare gains at 11500c   
and 12650c    are $9.32 million and $8.45 million, respectively, so the gains per 
household are $448 and $406 per year, respectively. This is because road congestion 
decreases and the total number of rail commuters increases as bottleneck capacity c  
increases. Fig. 8 shows the increases in population when the optimal uniform toll and 
fares are implemented. As the bottleneck capacity increases, the increases change greatly, 
because total commuting costs in Band 6 increase more than those in other bands and 
households try to move to other bands in order to decrease their total commuting costs.  




Note: (a) laissez-faire; (c) uniform toll and fares  
Table 5. Sensitivity analysis with regard to congestion degree in Situation 1 
 
8 In this sensitivity analysis, we consider how much the relative levels of train overcrowding and 
car congestion affect welfare gains. When congestion cost parameter f  increases, rail crowding 
costs and road congestion decreases. This is equal to the case of a decrease of the bottleneck 
capacity. 
 Band 1 Band 2 Band 3 Band 4 Band 5 
(a): Modal share (%) 65.3 62.0 62.4 62.7 63.1 
(c): Modal share (%) 66.0 58.7 59.1 59.5 59.8 
 W 
Welfare 
gain  Τ 𝑒ଵ 𝑒ଶ 𝑒ଷ 𝑒ସ 𝑒ହ 𝑛௥௔௜௟ Road congestion 
(10଻$) (%) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) (persons) (10଻$/𝑦𝑟) 
Situation 1          𝛿௖ = 10350          
(a) 2.499 － 0 0.44 0.88 1.31 1.75 2.19 7150 5.977 
(b) 6.574 100.0 － － － － － － 7396 0 
(c) 3.545 25.69 11.61 0.44 0.88 1.31 1.75 2.19 8195 5.097 
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Note: (a) laissez-faire; (b) first-best; (c) uniform toll and fares 
 
Fig. 8 Population increases 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper explores optimal uniform rail fares and car toll in a continuous and 
closed city with bottleneck congestion. When the bottleneck is located some distance 
from the CBD, the optimal fares and toll are represented by price distortion of the railway 
and cars, respectively. When the bottleneck is located at the edge of the CBD, the optimal 
fares and toll are determined by the difference in price distortions of the railway and cars.  












     =10350      =11500      =12650
𝛿௖ = 11500 (=original parameter)       
(a) 3.066 － 0 0.44 0.88 1.31 1.75 2.19 7045 5.462 
(b) 6.849 100.0 － － － － － － 7289 0 
(c) 3.999 24.65 10.25 0.44 0.88 1.31 1.75 2.19 7995 4.734 𝛿௖ = 12650          
(a) 3.543 － 0 0.44 0.88 1.31 1.75 2.19 6959 5.028 
(b) 7.079 100.0 － － － － － － 7201 0 
(c) 4.388 23.90 9.10 0.44 0.88 1.31 1.75 2.19 7828 4.407 
Situation 2          𝛿௖ = 11500 (=original parameter)       
(a) 5.311 － 0 0.44 0.88 1.31 1.75 2.19 6669 1.287 
(b) 7.881 100.0 － － － － － － 6907 0 
(c) 6.052 28.81 12.10 5.65 6.09 6.53 6.97 7.41 7134 0.857 
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achieve approximately 25% of the first-best. This is because road congestion is excluded 
to a certain degree by the optimal uniform toll. In addition, road congestion is mitigated 
because some car commuters change modes from car to rail. In addition, households in 
Band 6, which has no railway stations, move to the other bands because they incur higher 
total commuting costs than households in other bands. 
 When the bottleneck is located in the residential area, welfare gains of the optimal 
uniform toll and fares achieve approximately 30 % of the first-best. Households residing 
beyond the bottleneck contribute to road congestion, while households residing on the 
CBD side of the bottleneck have no effect on road congestion. Therefore, households 
beyond the bottleneck move to the area between the CBD and the bottleneck.    
Future research on this topic will extend to a consideration of commuter 
heterogeneity. The existence of user heterogeneity requires the analysis of departure-time 
decisions and residential location choices.  
 
Appendix A. Lagrangian function of the model  
A.1 First order conditions 
We obtain the optimal solution of Eq. (29) with a Lagrangian function. Appendix A 
derives the first order conditions in the case in which the bottleneck is in the residential 
area. The Lagrangian is very long because multiple heterogenous areas are linked with 
boundary conditions. This method is adopted in Kono and Joshi (2018) and Kono and 
Kawaguchi (2017). Some explanation of the mathematics (e.g., the relationship with the 
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where ( )i x  , ( )h x  , ( )i x   and    ( ),  1,2 ,  1,2,3i x h i     are the Lagrangian 
multipliers for travel cost of road, travel cost of rail, the population and the number of car 
commuters at location x, respectively.  ,   and   are respectively the Lagrangian 
multipliers of the boundary conditions of travel cost of road, rail and the total population 
at the edge of the CBD (𝑥 = 𝑥). At location 𝑥 = 𝑥௥, the total number of car commuters 
meets 2 3( ) ( )car carr rn x n x  . Because 1 ( ) 0rail rn x   , 2 3( ) ( )r rn x n x   for boundary 
condition. Other constraint conditions are 1 2( ) ( )b bn x n x  , 1 2( ) ( )car carb bn x n x  , 
2 3( ) ( )car carr rt x t x , 3 3( ) ( ) 0carn x n x   and 0 1( ) ( ) br x r x r  , where br  is the rent of 
the boundary between the CBD and the residential area. 
 Policy variables and endogenous variables are summarized in Table A1. After 




Table A1 Policy variables and endogenous variables 
Policy variables Endogenous variables Exogenous variables 
Car toll    Transportation cost ( )cart x , 
( )x  
Total Population N  
Railway fare at x ( )e x  Total traffic volume ( )carn x  Per capita income y  
  Traffic volume at x  ( )n x , 
( )carn x  
Generalized cost of a car 
per distance 
b  
  Shadow price for unit-
distance car cost 
( )x  Marginal cost of railway 
per passenger distance 
z  
  Shadow price for unit-
distance rail cost 
( )x  Construction cost of 
railway per distance 
I  
  Shadow price for population 
density at x  ( )x  Travel time cost of railway per distance a  
  Shadow price for the number 
of car commuters at x 
( )x    
  Shadow prices for boundary 
conditions at x x  , ,      
  Utility u    
The first order conditions are given by Eqs. (A2)-(A37). For simplicity, 
( ( ), ( ), , ( ))carr t x x G x   and ( ( ), ( ), , ( ))carq t x x G x   are denoted as 𝑟(𝑥) and 𝑞(𝑥), 
respectively. 
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2 22 2 2 2
2 2 2
( ) ( )0: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0( ) ( ) ( )car car car
L q x r xx x x n xt x t x t x  
         
   , (A5) 
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A.2 Shadow prices and derivation of Propositions 
 Arranging the first order conditions (A2) and (A10), we obtain: 
    1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))car carx J e x z J n x n x g n x n x          . (A38) 
Arranging Eqs. (A2), (A13) and (A24), we obtain: 
    1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )car carb bx J n x n x J n x n x     . (A39) 
Arranging Eqs. (A3), (A14) and (A33), we obtain 
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  2 2 2( ) ( ) ( )carx J n x n x   . (A40) 
Arranging Eqs. (A13), (A18) and (A39), we obtain  
    1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )car carb bx J N n x J n x n x      . (A41) 
Combining Eqs. (A3), (A30) and (A40) yields: 
  2 2 1 1( ) ( ) ( )carb b bx J n x n x    . (A42) 
Arranging Eqs. (A10), (A17), (A41), and (A42), we obtain 
    1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))car carx J e x zx J n x n x f n x n x       . (A43) 
Integrating Eq. (A38) from x x  to x  with the use of Eq. (A43), we obtain 
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. (A44) 
Combining Eqs. (A7), (A16), (A20), and (A41)-(A43), we obtain 1( ) 0x  . Integrating 
Eq. (A7) from 𝑥 = 𝑥 to 𝑥 with (A10), (A44) and 1( ) 0x  , we obtain 
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                       
   . (A45) 
Arranging Eqs. (A4), (A26) and (A39), we obtain 
 1( ) 0bx  . (A46) 
Arranging Eqs. (A5), (A6), (A31) and (A40), we obtain 2 3( ) ( )r rx x  . Arranging 
Eqs. (A6), (A9), (A36), (A37) with this equality, we obtain 
 32 3 3
3
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )r r
x x
r r carx x
r xx x dx J n x dxt x 
     . (A47) 
Arranging Eqs. (A4), (A5), (A9), (A15), (A19), (A27), (A36), (A39), (A40), (A46)-(A47), 
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yields 1 2 .JN    Arranging Eqs. (A4), (A19), (A28), (A41), and (A42) with this, 
we obtain: 
  1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )car car bx J n x n x   . (A48) 
Integrating Eq. (A4) from 𝑥 = 𝑥 to 𝑥 = 𝑥௕ with the use of Eqs. (A39), (A45), (A46) 
and (A48), we obtain 1( ) 0x  . Arranging Eqs. (A2), (A13), (A44) with this, we 
obtain the following condition. 
 1( ) 0x  . (A49) 
Arranging Eqs. (A3) and (A11), we obtain the following condition. 
    2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))car carx J e x z J n x n x g n x n x          . (A50) 
Arranging Eqs. (A10), (A11), (A23), (A28), (A39), and (A40), we obtain: 
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c
n xx Je x x Je x J s
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Combining Eqs. (A44) and (A51), we obtain the following condition. 
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 
.  (A52) 
Integrating Eq. (A50) from 𝑥 = 𝑥௕ to 𝑥 with the use of Eq. (A52), we obtain 
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Arranging Eqs. (A7), (A8), (A22), (A39), and (A40), we obtain the following condition. 
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. (A54) 
Integrating Eq. (A8) from 𝑥 = 𝑥௕ to 𝑥 with the use of Eqs. (A11), (A44), (A45), (A53) 
and (A54), we obtain 
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Arranging the first order conditions (A5), (A27), (A28) and Eq. (A42), we obtain  
 2 2 2 1( ) ( )carb bx Jn x     . (A56) 
Integrating Eq. (A5) from 𝑥 = 𝑥௕ to 𝑥 = 𝑥௥ with the use of Eqs. (A40), (A55) and 
(A56), we obtain 2 ( ) 0x  . Arranging Eqs. (A3), (A14), (A53) with this, we obtain 
2 ( ) 0x  . Eqs. (A44) and (A49) yields Proposition 2 (or Eq. (34)). Next, Eqs. (A53) and 
(A56) yield Proposition 3 (or Eq. (35)). Finally, (A49), (A54), and 2 ( ) 0x   yield 
Proposition 4.   
Regarding Proposition 1, we need another Lagrangian expressing the case in which 
the bottleneck is at the fringe of the CBD. We show the process in the online supplement 
and on the authors’ website. But the derivation process is very similar to the above. 
Appendix B. Empirical verification of Lemma 1 in Section 2.4 
In section 2.4, we explored the relationship between the train overcrowding cost and 
opportunity cost and summarized the properties of the equilibrium as Lemma 1. Appendix 
B empirically verifies the relationship, taking Tokyu railway in Tokyo as an example. 
We use the data of the train vehicle occupancies of trains on the Den-en-toshi Line 
and the Tōyoko Line, which pass a CBD station, Shibuya Station and Naka-meguro 
Station, respectively. The target time is between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. because many 
offices start working at 9:00 a.m. The data is from October 2nd, 2018. 
Firstly, we calculate train overcrowding costs per passenger based on the cost 
function in the benefit evaluation manual of railroad projects, provided by the Ministry 
of Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation. Next, we plot the overcrowding costs at each 
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station interval, as in Fig. B.1. and B.2. On the horizontal axis, station names are shown. 
The leftmost station is the CBD station. So, the commuters go from the right stations to 
the left stations. The vertical axis shows the overcrowding costs at each station. The time 
written above each line shows when each train arrives at the CBD station.      
To compare trains under the same conditions, in Den-en-toshi Line, we use data of 
only semi-express trains bound for Oshiage and Kiyosumi-shirakawa. On the Tōyoko 
Line, trains running during the target period are only commuter express and express trains. 
If the speed of trains is different, the origin and the destination patterns can be different. 
In particular, the commuter express being faster than the express, the area extending from 
the origin and the destination is wider. So, we only target the express trains.  
  
 




Fig. B.2. The train overcrowding cost on the Tōyoko Line 
The properties in Lemma 1 are demonstrated as Figs. B.1. and B.2 in the following way.  
Lemma 1 focuses on the two parts of the railway: the part between the CBD station 
and the station next to the CBD, and the part between the station next to the CBD station 
and farther stations. In Fig. B.1., we can regard the part between Ikejiri-ōhashi and 
Shibuya, and the part between Gakugei-daigaku and Naka-meguro as the two parts in 
Lemma 1. Trains arriving at Shibuya later basically have higher crowding costs, except 
for the train arriving at 8:28, if you separate the trains into two groups in terms of the 
destination station. The train arriving at Shibuya at 8:28 arrives at Otemachi at 8:47. As 
the vehicle occupancy of this train is less than that of the train arriving at 8:10, it is 
possible that some passengers on this train are late for work.   
Looking at Fig. B.1., the crowding costs are similar when the trains run in suburbs, 
while they are very different when the trains are close to Shibuya. This property is very 
close to the characteristics demonstrated in Lemma 1. But, the difference in the crowding 
cost appears not only in the part between Shibuya and the station next to Shibuya (i.e., 
Ikejiri-ōhashi) but also in the part between Sangen-jaya and Ikejiri-ōhashi. This is 
probably because Ikejiri-ōhashi is also within the CBD. A similar property can be seen in 
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Fig. B.2, too. Actually, the characteristics in Lemma 1 are more clearly shown in Fig. B.2.  
Appendix C. Parameter setting 
As the cost related to cars, bottleneck capacity cs  and parameter c  are set as 
11,500 households/hour and $14.436/hour, respectively. As the cost related to railway, 
the capacity of a train trainc   and the access cost Q  are set as 576 persons and $3.34 
per trip.9 The marginal cost of railway oz  is set as $0.219/person/km.10 The railway 
construction cost per km I  is set as $4,800,000/km/year.11 The generalized costs of 
car b and railway a are set as 0.77($/km) and 0.80($/km), respectively, considering 
the average free flow speeds carv =40(km/h) and railv =30(km/h).12 Congestion cost 
parameter f  and the end points of the probability density function 1a  and 1b  are set 
as 0.05$/km/person, -110 and 170, respectively, so that the probability of car use is 
approximately 60(%), which indicates the probability of using cars along the railway in 
Sendai. The value of congestion parameter f  differs across situations in order to 
analyze how much train overcrowding affects welfare gains.  
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